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ABSTRACT 
 
The Japan-China relationship is one of the most significant bilateral economic relationships in 
the world. However, it is also convoluted by political and historical tensions, which can be 
characterized as “hot economics, cold politics”. Although Japan is the second largest investor in 
China after Hong Kong, anti-Japanese protests periodically occur in China and anti-Japanese 
sentiments in China are commonplace in Japanese daily news. The central conflicts between 
these nations are the result of the legacy of World War II and territorial disputes. While the 
atrocities of the past remain part of the Sino-Japanese history, this historical brutality continues 
to influence China and Japan relations through Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese protests. 
Despite the underlying political tension, China and Japan have continued to trade and have a 
strong economic relationship. Japan has a powerful economy and China is the largest growing 
market in the world, and so Japan invests heavily in Chinese businesses. Because of this, 
Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role in both countries’ economies.  
FDI data over the past decade suggests that macroeconomic trends and natural disasters had the 
greatest effect on Japanese FDI. International FDI broadly declined in 2006, was mixed 
following the 2008 financial crisis, and broadly increased following the recovery from the crisis. 
Japanese FDI in China was an exception to the broad international increase in FDI in 2013. It is 
likely that the larger magnitude, longer duration anti-Japanese protests that occurred in 2012 over 
contentious contemporary and historical issues contributed to greater decreases in the amount of 
Japanese outward FDI in China. Although investment decisions are complex and take into 
account many factors, the decision to dramatically contract Japanese FDI to China in late 2012 
and early 2013 appears to be a direct economic response to the 2012 political protests. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
The Japan-China relationship is one of the most significant bilateral economic 
relationships in the world. The past 20 years have witnessed a dramatic rise in intra-Asian trade; 
50.1 percent of Asian exports were conducted within the region in 2008 (WTO 2009), with many 
products traveling from other parts of Asia to China for assembly and subsequent export to 
European or American markets. Moreover, China surpassed the United States to become Japan’s 
largest trading partner in 2005, having held the second place position since 1993. Similarly, 
Japan is currently China’s second largest trading partner after the U.S., having held the top 
position from 1994 to 2003. In terms of official development assistance, Japan offered China 
more than ¥3,063.3 billion in loans from 1979 to 2006, which accounted for more than half of 
the official aid that China had received at that time (Wan 2006). In addition, Japan’s foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to China grew from $177 million in 1987 to $9.1 billion in 2013 (JETRO, 
2013). Consequently, Japan became the second largest investor in China after Hong Kong. FDI 
is international capital flows in which a firm in one country creates or expands a subsidiary in 
another. It involves not only the transfer of resources but also the acquisition of control 
(Krugman & Obstfeld, 2000). In 2008 Japan’s outward FDI rose to its highest level, $ 115 billion, 
since 1990. The number of Japanese overseas affiliates approached 17,000 in 2007 and half of 
Japanese overseas affiliates in Asia are located in China. Thus, the worldwide phenomenon of 
globalization cannot be explained without describing the characteristics of Japan’s FDI (Noh & 
Mah, 2011). 
Despite the increasing economic integration, the political relationship between the two 
countries has been adversarial. The central conflicts between these nations are the result of the 
legacy of World War II, territorial disputes, coverage of World War II in Japanese history 
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textbooks, denials of Nanjing Massacre, and visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese 
politicians. The Nanking Massacre was committed by Japanese troops against the civilian 
residents of Nanking during a six-week period of the Second Sino-Japanese War starting from 
December 13, 1937. Although estimates vary, Chinese officials claim that over 300,000 Chinese 
were killed during this period by the Imperial Japanese Army (Chang, 2012). The Yasukuni 
Shrine is a Japanese Shinto shrine. It enshrines to war dead, including Class A war criminals, 
who served the Emperor of Japan during wars from 1867–1951. The Yasukuni Shrine and the 
Japanese Government have been criticized by neighboring countries including China as being 
revisionist and unapologetic about the events of World War II (Chang, 2012). 
While these atrocities remain part of the Sino-Japanese history, this historical brutality 
continues to influence China and Japan relations through Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese 
protests. The specific nature of nationalism in China is a result of unresolved historical matters as 
well as Chinese domestic politics and media. As a result, mutual distrust still exists between the 
two nations. Also, Japanese news outlets often air stories about anti-Japanese sentiment in China 
and this constant low-grade presence in the media of anti-Japanese feeling in China prevents the 
Japanese people from feeling close to China. For the past few decades, major anti-Japanese 
protests have occurred periodically in China. According to Jessica Chen Weiss (2008), the 
definition of an anti-Japanese protest is “a public manifestation by a group of people of 
disapproval or dissent, containing hostile feeling towards a foreign government or people, and 
rooted in advocacy or support for the nation’s interests, especially to the exclusion or detriment 
of other nations” (p.6-7). The most recent anti-Japanese protests of note occurred in 2005, 2010 
and 2012.  
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The main impetus for the 2005 protest was the reauthorization of a Japanese history 
textbook by the Japanese government that, according to critics, whitewashed Japanese war 
crimes of World War II. The most egregious alterations involved deleting references to the 
killing of civilians in the infamous Nanjing Massacre of 1937 and Japan’s denial of 
responsibility for its wartime aggression in China. Additional justifications for the protests 
included Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s refusal to stop visiting the Yasukuni 
Shrine in Tokyo that honors Japanese war dead, including fourteen war criminals, and objections 
to the negotiations for Japan to gain a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. On April 9, 
the Japanese Embassy in Beijing was surrounded by an estimated 20,000 Chinese protestors who 
threw rocks and shouted anti-Japanese slogans. Thousands more expressed their anger in other 
parts of the capital and damaged some Japanese retail stores and restaurants. The protest 
continued for about 3 weeks and ended in late April. In 2010, the catalyst for the protests was a 
maritime collision of a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard’s patrol boat near the 
Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands. Depending on the source, the number of participants ranged from 
several thousand to several tens of thousands. However, there is no denying that the protests 
were significant. In 2012, the central motivation for the protest was condemnation of Japan’s 
decision to purchase three of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. The Senkaku 
Islands, also known in Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands and called the Diaoyutai Islands by Taiwan, 
are a group of disputed islands in the East China Sea. According to Jessica Chen Weiss (2014), 
anti-Japanese protests happened in 208 of China’s 287 prefectural cities. 
The China-Japan economic relationship is convoluted by political and historical tensions 
and the relationship between these two nations has been dubbed “hot economics, cold politics” 
by scholars. How do these protests affect the economic relations of these two nations? The 
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conundrum is that economic relations are undoubtedly important to both nations, yet protests still 
continue. This raises the question; do anti-Japanese protests in China influence Japanese FDI in 
China?  
Two international relations theories provide explanations and assumptions regarding the	 
relationship between politics and economics. The first theory is neo-realist theory, the idea of 
“Politics over Economics”, which means that politics are more important than economics, 
therefore governments prioritize politics over economics and do not make political decisions 
primarily on economic concerns. Therefore, neo-realists support the idea that states will do 
whatever they feel necessary to protect their political interests and survival. According to Yinuo 
Geng (2011), “a realist perspective views power and security as the ambition of states; hence, 
given the central role of China and Japan, their strategic balances affect the geopolitical realities 
of Asia and the international system” (p. 20). Under this theory, the independent variable is 
politics and the dependent variable is economics. It was Kenneth Waltz who originally 
postulated this theory in his book, “Theory of International Politics” in 1979. The theory 
suggests that anti-Japanese protests do influence Japanese FDI in China and that economic 
interdependence on each other will not have a major influence on foreign policy decisions.  
  In contrast, the other theory is neo-liberal theory, which supports the idea of “Economics 
over Politics”, meaning economics are more important than politics and governments prioritize 
economics over politics and make political decision based on economical benefit. According to 
Gen (2011), “liberalism, with a focus on economic cooperation, seeks to describe and evaluate 
the increasing trade dependency between the two states” (p. 20). Under this theory, the 
independent variable is economics and the dependent variable is politics. The scholars who 
originally developed this theory were Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in their book, 
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“Power and interdependence” in 1973. This theory suggests that anti-Japanese protests do not 
influence Japanese FDI in China. Furthermore, the theory suggests that foreign relations are 
connected through interdependence and that economic interdependence creates vested interests 
opposed to conflict. Interdependence refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects 
among countries or among actors in different countries (Keohane & Nye Jr, 1973). Economic 
interdependence reduces conflict, i.e. “trade brings peace”, so interdependence is a form of 
mutual dependence.  
Although the original establishment of both neo-realist and neo-liberal theory goes back 
to the 1970s, these two theories are the most influential approaches and well-discussed theories 
in the field of international relations. According to Robert Powell (1994), the debate between 
these two approaches still dominates much of international relations theory (p. 1). 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between anti-Japanese protests 
in China and Japanese FDI in China as well as to thoroughly examine how Chinese nationalistic 
sentiment influenced contemporary anti-Japanese protests in 2005, 2010 and 2012 in terms of 
events and sources. This paper considers investment flow and anti-Japanese protest data to 
determine the correlation among variables. There is extensive research independently examining 
anti-Japanese protests in China and outward Japanese FDI in China. Also, the relationship 
between politics and economies in general, but not specifically on China and Japan, has been 
thoroughly investigated in other research. However, research that has aimed to evaluate both 
variables has been limited.  
This topic is important because a healthy bilateral relationship between China and Japan 
is mutually beneficial to the citizens of both nations and contributes to the peace and stability of 
East Asia. This research will attempt to answer whether both economies are robust enough and 
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whether the bilateral relationship between the two is stable enough to be immunized from 
influence by protests in China. If the result of this research shows that negative political events 
influence the amount of FDI, it is problematic for both countries. In the current global economy, 
it is important that both countries seek economic collaboration, resulting in economic growth. If 
the amount of FDI is reduced because of negative political events due to the legacy of World 
War II and the way Japan has been dealing with the issue with its neighboring countries, it is 
detrimental for both China and Japan. If that is the case, both countries should attempt a 
reconciliation of their differences regarding events that happened more than 70 years ago. 
China’s rapid economic development for the past several decades can be attributed to FDI from 
other countries and trade that is associated with that. Knowing with certainty that a negative 
political atmosphere is harming their economic relationship could push China and Japan toward 
improving their political relationship and this might lead to improved prosperity. 
My findings show that there is a threshold for anti-Japanese protests to influence the 
amount of FDI and the magnitude of influence is proportional to the size of the protests. In 2012, 
when protests were longer and occured in larger numbers of cities compared to the ones in 2005 
and 2010, the amount of FDI in the next fiscal year decreased. This suggests that the decision 
making process of whether to invest in China or not depends partially on the state of Sino-
Japanese bilateral relations and that political tensions are indeed important for the future of 
economic linkages in Asia. On the occasion of the April 2005 anti-Japanese protests, which were 
caused mainly by China’s opposition to Japan to becoming a member of U.N. Security Council, 
and the summer of 2012 anti-Japanese protests, which was consisted of condemning Japan’s 
decision to purchase three of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, it seems that 
politics influenced economics. However, in the case of the September 2010 anti-Japanese 
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protests, which were caused mainly by a maritime collision of Chinese trawler and Japanese 
Coast Guard’s patrol boat near the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands, I fond no effect.  
While this paper discusses the implications for how negative political events affecting 
economical relationship between China and Japan, it is important to point out that this study does 
not provide a comprehensive answer to the question. Other than political instability shown as 
anti-Japanese protests, there are many determinants of Japanese FDI in China such as market 
size, cost of capital, wages and exchange rates, etc. If a clear difference in FDI amount is 
observed after protest events, then it is plausible to assume that these negative events influence 
the amount of FDI. 
 This thesis proceeds as follows: In Chapter 2, as a literature review, I first note some 
scholarly works on contextual concepts, such as the history of tension between China and Japan, 
Chinese nationalism and Japanese FDI in China. Then I describe the literature on theoretical 
impact on FDI. In Chapter 3, I present the research design of this thesis and explain the method 
of researching the issue by specifying independent and dependent variables, describing the data I 
use and analysis procedure. Chapter 4 describes the data of each protests and Japanese FDI, and 
thereafter analyzes theoretical assumptions. Also, several cases are examined to strengthen my 
argument. The thesis concludes with discussion in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Contextual Concepts 
Historical Origins of the tension between China and Japan 
 China and Japan have had a complex relationship spanning more than a thousand years. 
Japan imported Chinese characters along with other advanced skills as early as 60 AD and China 
was often the source of new technologies and ideas for Japan (Fisman, Hamao, & Wang, 2014). 
However, relations have often been characterized by hostilities. There are two especially 
controversial issues between Japan and China at the moment; Japan’s response to the atrocities 
committed by the Imperial Japanese Army in World War II and the disputes over the Senkaku/ 
Diaoyu islands (Fisman et al., 2014).  
Many Chinese feel negatively about Japan because of its actions during the military 
occupation of China during World War II and also because of how Japan has dealt with these 
issues and Japan’s current actions since the war’s end (Geng, 2011). A survey conducted in 2004 
by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences indicated that there are only 0.7 percent who felt 
unneighbourly toward Japan because of personal unhappy experiences or those of family 
members. Each country has its own interpretation of the war between China and Japan and this 
could be one of the biggest sources of tension between the two nations. One of the most 
controversial issues is the number of civilians and soldiers that were killed in Nanjing, China in 
1937. The Nanking Massacre Museum in Nanjing states that 300,000 people were slaughtered. 
However, the Tokyo Trial claimed that the Japanese army killed 200,000 Chinese civilians and 
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POWs; and some in Japan believe the number to be only 50,000 (Yoshida, 2006).  Contemporary 
Chinese people may feel that Japan does not acknowledge the extent of the massacre. 
Yinuo Gen interviewed Chinese youth about these historical tensions and he asked what 
could be done to ameliorate Sino-Japan relations. He found that all those interviewed believed 
that the Japanese government should apologize sincerely and support the apology with deliberate 
actions. According to Gen (2011), “…the interviewees are aware of apologetic statements made 
by various Japanese administrations, but the problem occurs in the wording of these statements 
and the impression that Japanese actions (such as visits to Yasukuni Shrine, media attention on 
radical right-wing commentators, revision of school textbooks, and election of rightist politicians) 
undermine the value of those words” (p 14). For example, at the 58th Memorial Ceremony for 
the War Dead, former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stated "…during the war, Japan caused 
tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian 
nations. On behalf of the people of Japan, I hereby renew my feelings of profound remorse as I 
express my sincere mourning to the victims” (Koizumi, 2003). Even though the Japanese 
government issued an official apology as evidenced by the speech, the speaker himself, former 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, still visits Yasukuni Shrime to honor the Japanese war dead 
who committed the atrocities. Visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese politicians are seen as tacit 
support of the soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army and their actions. The Chinese people have 
interpreted this support as insincerity. In addition, revisions of history textbooks used in middle 
school and high school can be interpreted as attempts by the Japanese government to conceal 
facts about World War II from subsequent generations.  
Chinese youth also expressed discontent that individual victims were poorly compensated 
or not compensated at all. When discussing the apology issue, the Chinese youths ultimately 
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compare Japan’s lack of appropriate remorse to Germany’s clear actions. Even now, German 
companies have provided billions of dollars to their wartime victims and Holocaust survivors are 
still receiving regular compensation (Chu, 2007). According to Geng (2011), “Chinese youths 
are very aware of the difference in post-war actions between these two Axis powers and there is 
a sense of relative deprivation with regards to justice.  After all, denials of the Holocaust are 
outlawed in Germany” (p 15).  From the Chinese perspective, Japan has not made a sincere 
admission of guilt or paid war reparations. In the absence of a genuine apology from Japan, such 
as the one Germany provided to Holocaust victims, tensions between China and Japan are 
unlikely to ease.  
Another major issue between Japan and China is the dispute over ownership of the 
Senkaku islands. These islands, also known in Chinese as the Diaoyu Islands, are unpopulated 
rocky outcroppings located between Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands.  These islands have long 
been a point of dispute between Beijing and Tokyo, especially after the early 1970s when experts 
estimated that large oil deposits might be located on the continental shelf (Whiting, 1989). When 
Okinawa was returned to Japanese control from the United States under the Okinawa Reversion 
Treaty in 1971, the Senkaku islands also were returned to Japan (Lee, 2002). According to Shirk 
(2009), a Zhejiang University professor said “Japan’s ambition of seizing oil and gas resources 
on the continental shelf of the East China Sea is a new form of its expansionist and invading 
ideology during World War II” (p. 147). 
There are three national foreign policy relationships that China’s leaders consider the 
most “sensitive” in domestic politics; those with Japan, Taiwan, and the United States. Of these 
three countries, Japan is the most critical zone in all aspects of China’s foreign relations due to 
domestic sentiment about the aforementioned issues. For these reasons, Sino-Japanese relations 
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require a skillful balancing act on the part of Chinese leaders (Zheng, 1999).  Moreover, the issue 
involving Japan is an emotional one and Shirk (2009) stated “…it is the one issue on which 
public opinion really matters to the government” (p. 144). 
 
Chinese nationalism 
A discussion of the impact of anti-Japanese protests on Japanese FDI in China would be 
incomplete without a thorough examination of the distinctive nature of Chinese nationalism, as it 
can play a major role in motivating Chinese people to protest. Chinese nationalism has its roots 
in social movements of the early 1900s after the fall of the Qing dynasty and current nationalism 
in China is not a continuation of the earlier type. It was only when China engaged in 
international relations that the feeling of nationalism emerged. Guoguang Wu (2008) categorizes 
the first episode of Chinese nationalism as the post-imperial May Fourth nationalism and he 
described the latter as “the resurgence of nationalism rooted in a framework to examine 
nationalism’s connections with material interests, political power and cultural orientation” (p. 
467). Opinions vary on the type and form of nationalism. With respect to the type of nationalism, 
Allen Whiting (1995) suggested that there are three types of nationalism: affirmative, assertive 
and aggressive. Affirmative nationalism has a purely positive dynamic because it focuses 
exclusively on “us” as an in-group that takes pride in its national attributes and achievements. 
According to Jing-Dong Yuan (2008), this type of nationalism originates from feelings of 
patriotism and love of county. Assertive nationalism adds “them” as a negative out-group 
referent that challenges the in-group’s interests and possibly its identity. Aggressive nationalism 
identifies a specific foreign enemy as a serious threat that requires action to defend vital interests 
(Whiting, 1995). Yuan (2008) stated that this type originates from the sentiment of historical 
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indignation and victimization by Western countries and Japan. Alastair Johnston (1996) 
describes Chinese identity realism as the regime’s efforts to intensify in-group cohesiveness and 
the potential dangers posed by out-groups.  
According to Suisheng Zhao (2005), there are two forms of nationalism: ethnic 
nationalism and liberal nationalism. He defined that ethnic nationalism “produces a state-seeking 
movement to create an ethnic nation-state”(p. 133). Today, only among Tibetans, Uighurs, and 
Mongols has ethnic nationalism remained alive.  Liberal nationalism was introduced in the early 
twentieth century as a means to improve China through political and social reforms. Although 
liberal nationalists have identified with the Chinese state in the battle against foreign imperialism, 
they have not necessarily supported the Communist party, pressing for greater public 
participation in the political process and challenging authoritarian rule. Today’s Chinese leaders 
must compete with both ethnic and liberal nationalism to offer their own nationalist vision to 
build a nation-state and assure that nationalism is a force over which the party maintains control. 
As a result, pragmatic nationalism began to occur. Zhao (2005) uses the term “pragmatic 
nationalism” in the same way as “state-led nationalism”, meaning that the CCP uses nationalism 
as an effective instrument for enhancing the CCP’s legitimacy. 
The cause of nationalism in China can be classified as either historical or CCP controlled.  
Some scholars suggest there are deep historical reasons for Chinese people to be nationalistic, 
which motivate protests.  However, there are others who suggest the CCP uses nationalism and 
anti-Japanese sentiment to legitimatize the CCP in the face of social and economic change. 
Nationalism rooted in history can be considered “bottom-up nationalism” and the one controlled 
by CCP as “top-down nationalism”.  
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Peter Hays Gries (2004)  supports the idea of “bottom-up nationalism” and argues that 
nationalism in China is in fact a mass movement and not controlled by CCP. He states that the 
history of humiliation by Western countries and Japan and the passions of the masses contribute 
greatly to nationalism in China. These passions, which are affected by emotion, are important for 
understanding nationalism in China. The Chinese consider that they are superior to the Japanese 
and the Japanese do not acknowledge this supposed Chinese superiority. In this situation, the 
Chinese would accept any apology by the Japanese government. Especially in the case with 
Japan, there is not only the anger stemming from Japanese war atrocities during World War II, 
but also a higher ethical anger based on the perceived injustice of Japan’s humiliating defeat of 
China of during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 to 1895. Therefore, Gries’ argument is that 
angry emotions, which are rooted in history, are the cause of nationalism in China.  
On the other hand, there are some scholars who support the idea of “top-down 
nationalism” and argue that the CCP uses nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiments to 
legitimatize the CCP in the face of social and economic change and the declining appeal of 
communism. In theory, all the information received in China, through media and education, is 
controlled by a single party system. After the collapse of communism, the CCP needed a cause to 
unite the Chinese people and as the CCP found, promoting nationalism was the best way to do so. 
Joseph S. Nye (1993) found that “nationalism proved to be stronger than socialism when it came 
to bonding working classes together” (p. 61). Suisheng Zhao (2005) explained that nationalism 
has become an effective instrument for enhancing the CCP’s legitimacy and pragmatic 
nationalism identifies China closely with the Communist party. Chinese politicians use Japan-
related issues to mobilize support for themselves as strong leaders or to divert attention from 
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difficult domestic problems. The less confident the leaders, the more they fan the fires of anti-
Japanese nationalism (Shirk, 2009).  
The key component of this argument is the Patriotic Education Campaign, the first 
official document which was issued by the CCP Central Propaganda Department in 1991, 2 years 
after the Tiananmen Incident. Zhao (1998) mentioned “…the essence of the patriotic education 
campaign was to make the Chinese people support the leadership of the Communist Party” (p. 
296). Also, he argued that the patriotic education campaign in Post-Tiananmen China influenced 
the rise of nationalism and he calls this movement “state-led nationalism”. He concluded that 
“…a vigorous official propaganda campaign in patriotic education was behind the seemingly 
spontaneous rise of Chinese nationalism in 1990s” (1998, p. 300). 
Regardless of whether Chinese nationalism is rooted in history or the CCP, there is no 
denying that the method of history instruction in China plays a major role in instilling 
nationalism in Chinese people. For example, the memory of Imperial China is distorted and 
based on these distorted memories, the Chinese blame all diplomatic controversies on western 
nations for their imperialist exploitation and especially neighboring countries for their 
ungratefulness to the Chinese empire (Yu, 2014). Due to the declining appeal of communism, as 
well as the corruption and isolation of official academia, the Chinese government is under heavy 
pressure to follow the distorted memory and restore China’s historical glory (Yu, 2014). 
According to Nozaki and Inokuchi (2000), the content of a history textbook is important and can 
form the basis for a national identity. Unlike subjects such as mathematics and science, history is 
subjective and context is necessary to put events, people, and ideas in perspective. They argue 
that education is one of the most effective ways to promote a national narrative, namely official 
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history, and to make and remake certain individual identities into national identities through 
selection bias. 
In sum, the salient point when understanding nationalism in China is that there is no one 
single definition to describe all the nationalistic sentiment in China. Instead, it is a combination 
of those elements mentioned above. This is especially true in the years following China’s 
admittance to the WTO in 2001 and its rapid economic growth. The environment surrounding 
Chinese citizens has been changing very rapidly as well, which has resulted in changes in the 
types of nationalism. It seems that new a generation of nationalism is a mix of what is rational 
and realistic. For example, according to the data published by Ipsos-Reid in 2004, many Chinese 
people have a positive image toward American corporations. According to the data by UNESCO 
in 2006, the country that accepts the most Chinese exchange students is the US, with the second 
most being Japan. This is counterintuitive considering that most of the recent major anti-foreign 
protests in China are against either the US or Japan. Despite the dissimilarities mentioned above, 
some similarities in Chinese nationalism can be found in published literature. One is that if it 
were not for nationalistic sentiment, Chinese people would not have anti-Japanese protests. The 
other is the fact that nationalism can be regarded as a double-edged sword in the authoritarian 
context. Regardless of the cause of Chinese nationalism, whether it is historical reasons or in the 
interest of the CCP, it could backfire on the ruling CCP. The CCP needs their own citizens to be 
supportive of their regime. However, if they become too nationalistic, they may harm the CCP. 
Students demonstrations are an important political phenomena in many countries, but they carry 
special import in China because of their historical role in challenging authority (Whiting, 1989). 
Whenever anti-Japanese emotions boil over into large-scale protests, it takes a delicate touch to 
halt the protests without having them turn against the CCP instead. As a scholar Zhen Yongnian 
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(Zheng, 1999)says, the use of nationalism is beneficial for the regime, however it must stop at 
some point. In South Korea during the 1960s, public protests against what people viewed as the 
weak stance of the country’s dictatorial leaders in dealing with Japan fueled the movement 
toward democracy – the same thing could happen in China (Shirk, 2009).  
 
Japanese FDI in China 
Despite the underlying political tension, China and Japan have continued to trade and 
have a strong economic relationship. Japan has a powerful economy and China is the largest 
growing market in the world, and so Japan invests heavily in Chinese business. Because of this, 
Japanese FDI plays an important role in both countries’ economy. 
The definition of FDI is international capital flows in which a firm in one country creates 
or expands a subsidiary in another. It involves not only the transfer of resources but also the 
acquisition of control (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2000). Sodersten and Reed (1990) further articulate 
that FDI is in essence a collection of capital, technology and management skills transmitted by 
multinational enterprises or transnational corporations. According to John F. Cassidy (2002), 
FDI is cross-border expenditures to acquire or expand control of productive assets, and the asset 
may be wholly-owned or part of a joint venture relationship. 
Strategically, forms of FDI can be divided into two types, namely, vertical FDI and 
horizontal FDI. The main purpose of vertical FDI includes securing natural resources, such as 
timber, pulp, and paper products, as well as gaining entry into markets, such as food and 
chemical products. With vertical FDI, different stages of activities are added abroad. There are 
two sub-types of vertical FDI. One is called forward vertical FDI and is where the FDI takes the 
corporation nearer to the market. Toyota acquiring a car distributorship in America is an example. 
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The other one is called backward Vertical FDI and is where international integration moves back 
towards raw materials. Toyota acquiring a rubber plantation is an example. This type of 
investment, which may be called “complementary” or “pro trade” pattern, does not impact 
domestic production and employment negatively at home. On the other hand, horizontal direct 
investment may either reduce, or conversely increase, both domestic production and employment 
(Kishi, 2003). With horizontal direct investment, companies carry out the same activities abroad 
as at home. An example is that Toyota assembles cars in both Japan and the United Kingdom. 
The increase of Japanese FDI has been remarkably high since the mid-l980s, and in 1989 
Japan was the world's largest FDI supplier in terms of the value of annual flows (Urata, 1993). 
When compared to other leading investing countries, Japan was the notable exception as most of 
the other leading investing countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Germany, are also major recipient countries of FDI. FDI influences the economic and trade 
performance of the investing as well as the recipient countries. By creating employment, by 
transferring foreign technology, and possibly by expanding exports, FDI promotes the economic 
growth of recipient countries. The effect on investing countries is more mixed. FDI may improve 
the allocation of resources by speeding up the process of structural adjustment, while it may 
deteriorate the economic situation by removing the industrial base out of the investing countries, 
a “hollowing out” of the industry (Urata, 1993). 
Market size, cost of capital, political stability, levels of literacy, exports from foreign 
invested enterprises in China, township and village enterprise growth rates, wages, exchange 
rates, economic integration and cultural differences have been found to be determinants of FDI 
in China (Cassidy, 2002). The real exchange rate between the Yuan and Yen could be one of the 
most important variables to determine Japanese FDI in China. According to Xing (2006), while 
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FDI has many determinants, these empirical results suggest that the real exchange rate is one of 
the significant factors affecting Japanese FDI in China, and the fluctuations in Japanese direct 
investment in China over the period can be attributed to the fluctuations of the real bilateral 
exchange rate.  
The key point is that unlike total trade (imports and exports), FDI is driven by one side 
investing in the other. In the Japan and China case, it is the decision of Japanese businesses to 
invest in China. Is the decision mostly economic or can Chinese domestic political and social 
conditions influence these investment decisions? 
 
2.2 Theoretical Impact of Politics on Economics 
Neo-realist theorists argue that politics are more important than economics. Therefore 
governments prioritize politics over economics and do not make political decision based on 
economic benefit. Therefore, neo-realists support the idea that states will do whatever they feel 
necessary to protect their political interests and survival. Pollins (1989b) used the Conflict and 
Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), coded diplomatic events reported in newspapers. He has modified 
it to weight events according to significance and proposed that importers trade with friendly 
counties in order to manage risk and minimize potential economic disruption. Therefore politics 
does influence economy and political factors that influence the likelihood of future conflict affect 
economic relations. Also, in his other article, he stated that “In addition to considerations of price 
and quality, consumers may wish to express goodwill or solidarity toward those whom they 
identify as friends, while shunning or punishing those they perceive as foes” (Pollins, 1989a, p. 
740). Analysis of trade and conflict by Keshk, Pollins, and Reuveny (2004) concluded “Political 
relations are driving commerce, not the other way around” (p 1175). In addition, Fisman, Hamao 
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and WangFisman et al. (2014) studied the impact of nationalism and interstate frictions on 
economic relations. They analyzed how politically hostile events, anti-Japanese protests in 2005 
and 2010, reacted to the stock market and identified the economic impact on individual firms. 
On the other hand, neo-liberal theorists, however, argue that politics does not have a 
significant influence on countries with high levels of economic interdependence. This theory is 
embedded in the concept of economic interdependence and scholars of interdependence rhetoric 
argue that “conflicts of interest are reduced by interdependence, and that cooperation alone holds 
the answer to world problems” (Keohane & Nye Jr, 1973, p. 7). They support the idea that due to 
economic interdependence, politics does not influence economic relations among nations. Davis 
and Meunier (2011) examined diplomatic events from 1990 to 2004 by using the King-Lowe 
data. The datasets provided by King and Low (2003) extends the approach of these earlier 
surveys, such as COPDAB, using computer coding of media reports. Virtual Research 
Associates Reader, a computer coding program, scans daily Reuters news reports and prepares a 
list of events, identifying the principal actors and major participants, the date, and the type of 
event according to trigger words (i.e., complaint, demonstration, size, etc.). The program is 
believed to be as accurate as human coders. Davis and Meunier concluded that politics do not 
influence economy and found no observable evidence that political tensions harmed economic 
relations. Finally, Maoz (2009) conducted a thorough series of statistical tests and found strong 
support for the paradigm that economic interdependence reduces conflict. In other words, he 
concluded that economics prevails over politics. 
One possible reason for the incongruence between the scholars who support neo-realist 
theory and those who endorse neo-liberal theory could be the selection of the economic variables. 
When scholars investigate political impacts on economics, the results could differ based on 
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which economic variables they are looking at, for example, trade amount such as import and 
export, stock market values or the amount of FDI. The other reason could be the time scholars 
examined. For example, Pollins used in his original research began in 1955 and ended in 1978 
and Davis and Meunier’s data was from 1990 to 2004. As the environment that surrounds 
politics and economics has been changing dramatically for the past few decades, and as 
liberalization has broadened across a wide range of countries, it has become increasingly 
uncommon for nations to indulge in detrimental economic policies, such as trade interference, in 
response to political conflict. 
 
2.3 Goals for Thesis 
This study aims to contribute to the existing body of literature on this topic in three ways. 
The first is to present contemporary data by reviewing data until 2013. The Sino-Japanese case 
which Davis and Meunier examined was from 1990 to 2004 (Davis & Meunier, 2011). Fisman, 
Hamao and Wang examined until 2010 (Fisman et al., 2014). My study includes the 2012 anti-
Japanese protests in China to see the impacts of the events on FDI in 2013.  
The second goal is to evaluate the specific variables that are unique to China and Japan, 
that is historical tension between the two nations and nationalistic sentiment in China. This 
research is not for arguing whether politics influence economics in general, nor is it to compare 
the cases with other countries’ situation. My purpose is to determine whether politics influences 
economics between these specific countries. Pollins (1989b) selected six different nations (the 
United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet 
Union, Egypt, and India) with three worlds of development; the worlds of advanced industrial 
nations, socialist central planning, and developing nations to see if the model applies only to 
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certain types or to all. Just because politics influenced economics in those countries, it does not 
mean the same theory applies to China and Japan’s situation.  
The last goal is to use the amount of Japanese outward FDI in China to study the 
economic effects of politics. There are some studies which found that political variables such as 
multilateral summit outcomes (Bechtel & Schneider, 2010), periods of transition (Bittlingmayer, 
1998), platforms of presidential candidates (Jensen & Schmith, 2005), and political connections 
(Fisman, 2001) can affect equity markets. Chan and Wei (1996) and Kim and Mei Kim and Mei 
(2001) both looked at the effect of political news on the Hong Kong stock exchange and find 
significant effects on market volatility and returns. However, what I will use as the economic 
variable is the amount of FDI. In this study, I only look at Japanese outward FDI in China, as it 
is believed that this category best reflects the result of anti-Japanese sentiment in China.  
  
	  
	  
22	  
Chapter 3: Method 
In this thesis, I looked at the influence of anti-Japanese protests, which were negative 
political events, on economics in 2005, 2010 and 2012. Therefore the independent variable was 
politics, or more specifically, it is the data for anti-Japanese protests in 2005, 2010 and 2012. The 
dependent variable was economics, that is, the amount of Japanese FDI in China. The neo-realist 
hypothesis was anti-Japanese protests influence Japanese FDI in China and the neoliberal 
hypothesis was anti-Japanese protests do not influence Japanese FDI in China.  
 
Main data 
I used a combination of both qualitative and quantitative approaches to answer my 
research questions. To acquire information on three anti-Japanese protests, I used other literature, 
especially by Jessica Chen Weiss, the famous scholar on anti-foreign protests in China. As for 
information on FDI, I used the data published by the Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO), a government-related organization. This data was publically available on their website.  
 
Analysis procedure 
I compared the events data of anti-Japanese protests to the amount of FDI and examined 
the influence of anti-Japanese protests on FDI. To see whether these protests in 2005, 2010 and 
2012 influenced the amount of FDI, I compared the FDI data in 2006, 2011 and 2013 
respectively as the influence should be visible in the next year, if there was any. Then, the 
amount of global Japanese FDI was examined to present the deviation of the FDI in China from 
the norm. In order to strengthen my argument, I examined control variables, regional comparison 
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and other independent variables. Additional data, the sentiment of Japanese investors, both 
Japanese and Chinese public opinion, were presented as well.  
 
Control variable: The United States, the United Kingdom and Thailand 
 The United States, the United Kingdom and Thailand were the top FDI destination 
countries, other than China, for Japan in 2013. These three nations have politically amicable 
relations with Japan, therefore they were chosen to be control variables to ascertain whether the 
Japanese FDI trend fluctuated in the absence of politically negative events. I collected the data 
from JETRO on their website, which was publically available. 
 
Regional comparison: South Korea, Taiwan and Russia 
In order to examine whether the change in FDI might be due to the regional economy, I 
examined the amount of South Korean FDI to China, Taiwanese FDI to China and Russian FDI 
to China. I used the China Statistical Yearbook, which was publicly available online in China 
Data Online. South Korea, Taiwan and Russia were selected mainly because these countries have 
historical or territorial dispute with Japan, and because they are neighboring countries and share 
a border in the ocean. After I looked into these additional examples of FDI with the region, I 
finally compared them with Japan’s FDI in China to see whether trends were the same. My 
reasoning was that if it is the same, it means that anti-Japanese protests do not influence the 
amount of FDI in China and influences were just economical and regional. If the trends are 
different from the one with Japan and China, I concluded that the relationship between China and 
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Japan is different from the other regional area and protests might have influenced the amount of 
FDI. 
 
Additional data 
I looked at the sentiment of Japanese investors in the aftermath of the protests by using a 
special survey of Japanese business in China by the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 
a government-related organization. This data is also publicly available on their website. I also 
looked at public opinion data from both countries to see how Japanese public opinion on Chinese 
people has been changing and vice versa. For the Japanese public opinion of Chinese people, I 
mainly used the data compiled by the Cabinet Office of Japan. For the Chinese public opinion of 
Japanese people, I mainly used the surveys conducted by the Institute for Japanese Studies of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Finally, I studied how Chinese nationalism has been 
changing by analyzing the source of anti-Japanese protests.  
 
Other independent variables: Exchange rate and FDI policy change in China 
In order to eliminate the possibility of other explanations for the cause of fluctuation in 
FDI, I looked into 2 other independent variables. One is exchange rate fluctuation between the 
Chinese Yuan and Japanese Yen as it could be one of the most significant factors on determining 
Japanese FDI in China. The devaluation of the Yuan could enhance inflows of FDI from Japan 
and vice versa. I obtained the exchange rate data available online and examined closely whether 
the exchange rate fluctuation influenced the outward Japanese FDI. The other independent 
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variable is the existence of FDI policies change in China, as it could contribute fluctuation in 
FDI as well. 
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Chapter 4: Result and Analysis 
In Chapter 4, I will present data of anti-Japanese protests in China and outward Japanese 
FDI in China and compare to see the trends. The data of the amount of global Japanese FDI, 
control variables, regional comparison, sentiment of Japanese investors on outward Japanese FDI 
in China and public opinion survey both in Japan and China about each other will follow.  
 
4.1 Anti-Japanese Protests in China 
As for the definition of anti-foreign protest, Jessica Chen Weiss (2008) uses the term 
“nationalist protest” and “anti-foreign protest” interchangeably in her research. She defined both 
terms as “A public manifestation by a group of people of disapproval or dissent, containing 
hostile feeling towards a foreign government or people, and rooted in advocacy or support for the 
nation’s interests, especially to the exclusion or detriment of other nations” (p.6-7). She stated 
the importance of distinction of protest from an official rally or other state-organized 
demonstration and defined the difference as follow:  
Official rallies are organized under government or party auspices and attended by 
a select group of pre-screened participants. Protests—including demonstrations, 
petitions, marches, and strikes—may receive official permission but are organized 
and attended by individuals acting in a private capacity, or as part of an 
independent organization. Thus, the theory developed here does not encompass 
state-orchestrated mass demonstrations such as those in North Korea or in China 
during the Mao Zedong era, as those protests did not carry the same risk of 
turning against the regime. (Weiss, 2008, pp. 6-7) 
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In this thesis, three major protests are considered. The aspects of these protests that I look 
at are dates, duration, location, main reason, and the tiers of cities in China that had protests. 
According to Grace K.M. Wong and L. Yu (Wong & Yu, 2003), first-tier cities refer to “cities 
being granted approval by China’s central government to establish joint venture retail enterprises” 
(p. 62). Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, and the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) are examples of 
first-tier cities. Also, they stated that second and third-tier cities are “those without such 
approvals but with good potential due to their advantageous location of being in close proximity 
to first-tier cities. For example, Suzhou and Wuxi are located in the Yangtze Delta in the vicinity 
of Shanghai, while Shantou and Zhuhai are situated in the Pearl Delta near Guangdong” (Wong 
& Yu, 2003, p. 62). The number of protesters is a general estimate as it is impossible to get the 
exact number on this item. 
 
Event 1: Anti-Japanese Protests in 2005 
On April 5, 2005, the Japanese government reauthorized the use of a history textbook that, 
according to critics, whitewashed Japanese war crimes of World War II especially the slaughter 
of civilians in the infamous Nanjing Massacre of 1937 and denied Japan’s responsibility for its 
wartime aggression in China. And Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi refused to stop 
visiting the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo that honors Japanese war dead, including fourteen war 
criminals. On top of that, the negotiations over U.N. Security Council reform triggered the 
Chinese to have the protests. Due to the series of these events, a leading Bao Diao activist, who 
Weis had an interview with stated “it was like pouring oil on fire” (Weiss, 2008, p. 102). Hints of 
protest had taken place in earlier weeks, but the official announcement for the reauthorization of 
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the use of a history textbook was followed by mass anti-Japan rallies across China, possibly 
coordinated by the Chinese government (Fisman et al., 2014).  
The duration of the anti-Japanese protests in 2005 were approximately 3 weeks, from 
April 2 to April 17, and clustered mainly on the weekends. Weiss estimated that anti-Japanese 
protests happened during this period at least in 38 cities and the location varied based on the 
dates: On April 2-3, protests happened in the cities of Chengdu and Shenzhen, on April 9-10 in 
Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and others, and April 16-17 in Shanghai, Shenyang, 
Shenzhen, and other cities across China (Weiss, 2008), and these protests happened mainly in 
first-tier cities. Others scholars, such as Gries, Zhao, He and Xu (Gries, 2005; He, 2007; X. Wu, 
2007; Zhao, 2005) have estimated that 280 organizations and units, 107 universities, 41 technical 
schools, and 28,230,000 internet users signed petitions against Japan’s bid for a permanent seat 
on the U.N. Security Council. 
On Saturday, April 9, 2005, more than ten thousand students congregated in the largest 
mall in Zhongguancun – not to shop, but to demonstrate against Japan and what they considered 
its failure to properly acknowledge the atrocities it committed when it occupied China during 
World War II. On April 16, the largest and most violent protest occurred in Shanghai, China’s 
most cosmopolitan city. A city government spokesman estimated the size of the crowd at twenty 
thousand, but some eyewitnesses believed it was as large as one hundred thousand. After three 
weeks of protests, the CCP finally sent clear signals that it was time to stop (Shirk, 2009). These 
signals include a statement by Hu Jintao to have social stability and text messages sent from the 
Public Security Bureau not to participate in protest.  
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Event 2: Anti-Japanese Protests in 2010 
On September 7, 2010, a Chinese trawler collided with two Japanese coast guard vessels 
in disputed waters just off the Senkaku Islands, leading to the detention of the Chinese trawler 
captain by Japanese authorities (Wallace & Weiss, 2014). When China’s repeated demands for 
the captain’s release were refused and his detention extended for a further ten days, the Chinese 
government cancelled all ministerial-level meetings between the two countries. On September 24, 
Japan released the captain, citing in part the effect on Sino-Japanese relations. The Senkaku 
event brought about a series of demonstrations against Japan and Japanese products across China, 
beginning in October 16 and then spreading to many other cities. Protests continued to the end of 
October, with the final demonstrations reported on October 28. The anti-Japanese protest lasted 
for nearly 10 days and happened in Beiijing, Tianjin, Shianghai, Chongquing, Shenyang, 
Changsha, Xi’an, Zhengzhou, Wuhan, Fujian, Mianyang and Deyang. Therefore, these protests 
happened in both first and second tier cities. 
 
Event 3: Anti-Japanese Protests in 2012 
The anti-Japanese protest in 2012 was more violent and there were greater property 
damage than the previous protests. According to the New York Times (Johnson & Shanker, 
2012), “A factory for the Panasonic Corporation was set on fire in Qingdao, and a Toyota 
dealership was looted”. In addition, the Japanese Embassy was attacked and there was damage to 
Japanese stores and restaurants in major cities. One main difference besides the intensity of the 
protests was that Japanese companies and business were targeted and damaged. 
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On July 7, 2012, the 75th anniversary of Japan’s full-scale invasion of China in 1937, the 
Japanese government announced its intent to purchase three of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands from 
their private Japanese owner. The anti-Japanese protest in 2012 happened in two waves. The 
early wave occurred in August, with 51 Chinese cities having at least one anti-Japanese protest. 
Following Japan’s decision to proceed with the islands purchase on September 10, the second 
wave of protests took place from September 11-23. September 18 is the anniversary of the 
Manchurian Incident, a staged event engineered by Japanese military personnel as a pretext for 
the Japanese invasion in 1931 of Manchuria, and the second wave of the protest peaked on this 
day, with at least 128 cities having protests. In total, the protest lasted for 6 weeks, from August 
15 to the end of September. Of the 287 prefectural level cities in the data, which were collected 
by Wallace and Weiss, 208 had at least one anti-Japanese protest, recording a total of 377 anti-
Japanese protests. These protests happened in both first and second tier cities. The main reason 
for the protest was condemning Japan’s decision to purchase three of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu 
islands in the East China Sea (Wallace & Weiss, 2014).  
 
4.2 Foreign Direct Investment 
Japanese FDI in China  
Japanese FDI in China declined by 6.17% after the protest in 2005 and 67.54% after the 
protest in 2012, however it increased by 74.43% after the protest in 2010 as shown in figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Japan's FDI in China 
Source: The Japan External Trade Organization 
Note: Each vertical dash line represents the year of anti-Japanese protests in China 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the data presented in Figures 1 and anti-Japanese protests in 2005, 2010 and 
2012. 
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Table 1: Anti-Japanese protests data and FDI 
Protest Date Duration Main Reason Location in China FDI 
Influence 
April 2-3 to  
April 16-17 
3 weeks U.N. Security Council 
reform 
At least 38 cities 
 
First-tier cities 
 
Yes  
(6.17% 
decrease) 
2010 
September 8 to 
September 18 
10 days A maritime collision of 
Chinese trawler and Japanese 
Coast Guard’s patrol boat 
near the Senkaku/ Diaoyu 
islands 
 
At least 12 cities 
 
First and Second 
tier cities 
No 
(74.43% 
increase) 
2012 
August 15 to the 
end of September 
One month 
and a half 
Condemning Japan’s 
decision to purchase three of 
the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands 
At least 208 cities  
 
First and Second 
tier cities 
Yes 
(67.54% 
decrease) 
Source: Weiss, J. C. (2008). Powerful patriots: nationalism, diplomacy, and the strategic logic of 
anti-foreign protest  
 
Global Japanese FDI 
 In order to indicate the deviation of the FDI in China from the norm, the amount of global 
Japanese FDI is presented in figure 2. It increased in all of the three years, 2006, 2011 and 2013, 
by 10.35 % after the protest in 2005, by 90.15% after the protest in 2010 and by 10.37 % after 
the protest in 2012. 
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Figure 2: Global Japanese FDI 
Source: The Japan External Trade Organization 
Note: Each vertical dash line represents the year of anti-Japanese protests in China 
 
Control Variable: The United States, The United Kingdom and Thailand 
Three nations with which Japan enjoys amicable relations were selected to serve as 
control cases to explore other influences on FDI. The United States, the United Kingdom and 
Thailand were the top FDI destination countries, other than China, for Japan in 2013. These three 
nations have politically amicable relations with Japan, therefore they were chosen to be control 
variables to ascertain whether the Japanese FDI trend fluctuated in the absence of politically 
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negative events.  Figure 3 depicts Japanese FDI in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Thailand, and Table 2 presents a summary of the data presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Japan's FDI in the United States, the United Kingdom and Thailand 
Source: The Japan External Trade Organization 
Note: Each vertical dash line represents the year of anti-Japanese protests in China 
 
United States 
 The data (Figure 3, a) shows that Japanese FDI in the United States marginally 
declined after the protest in 2005 and increased significantly after the 2010 and 2012 protests. 
The data for Japanese FDI in the United States appears to follow economic trends. The drastic 
decline from 2008 to 2009 was likely related to the global financial crisis. Following a period of 
stabilization, FDI gradually returned to its pre-crisis peak of 2008.  
 
United Kingdom 
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 The data (Figure 3, b) shows that Japanese FDI in the United Kingdom increased after 
the protests in 2005, 2010, and 2013. Similar to the data for the United States, Japanese FDI in 
the United Kingdom also appears to follow economic trends. As with the United States, Japanese 
FDI was impacted by the 2008 global financial crisis but has since recovered to exceed its pre-
crisis peak of 2008. 
 
Thailand 
 The data (Figure 3, c) shows that Japanese FDI in Thailand marginally declined after 
the protest in 2005 and increased after the protests in 2010 and 2012. The trend in Japanese FDI 
in Thailand is similar to that of the United States and United Kingdom, with the exception of the 
significant decline in 2012. The massive decline can be attributed to the disastrous floods that 
inundated Bangkok in 2011. The World Bank estimated that the disaster ranked as the world's 
second most costliest disaster of 2011, surpassed only by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. 
 The data shows that the amount of Japanese FDI in Thailand increased by 1,761%.  
Japanese FDI in Thailand was $7,133 million in 2011, $547 million in 2012, and $10,174 million 
in 2013. The comparatively small amount of FDI in 2012 was an anomaly and was in response to 
the severe flooding that occurred from July 2011 to January 2012 in Thailand. This data point 
may not be valid for comparison since the decrease in FDI was likely in response to the natural 
disaster and its impact on the recipient nation, Thailand, rather than due to a change in the policy 
of the patron nation, Japan. 
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Table 2 summarizes the trends observed from the data presented in Figures 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Table 2: Fluctuation in FDI from Japan to China, the US, the UK, Thailand and Global 
 China United States United Kingdom Thailand Global 
2006 
 
 
6.17% 
Decrease 
23.34% 
Decrease 
150.44% 
Increase 
6.64% 
Decrease 
10.35% 
Increase 
2011 
 
 
74.43% 
Increase 
60.23% 
Increase 
205.47% 
Increase 
217.36% 
Increase 
90.15% 
Increase 
2013 
 
67.54% 
Decrease 
36.68% 
Increase 
12.10% 
Increase 
1,761.30% 
Increase 
10.37% 
Increase 
Source: The Japan External Trade Organization 
 
The table suggests that the fluctuation in Japanese FDI in China in 2006 and 2011 can be 
attributed to global concerns rather than Sino-Japan specific issues.  However, the decline in FDI 
in 2013 appears to be unrelated to macroeconomic considerations.  Additional investigation is 
necessary to determine the effect of regional politics on Japanese FDI. 
 
Regional Comparison: South Korea, Taiwan and Russia’s FDI in China 
In order to ascertain whether the fluctuations in FDI amount were due to regional issues 
and to determine whether the dip in FDI in China was caused by the anti-Japanese protests or not, 
it is necessary to examine neighboring countries’ outward FDI patterns in China and compare 
them with the Japanese FDI in China. Figure 4 depicts South Korea, Taiwan and Russia’s FDI in 
China. The data of the Taiwanese and Russian FDI in China in 2013 were not available, 
therefore I limit the observation on their FDI in 2006 and 2011 only.  
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Figure 4: South Korea, Taiwan and Russia's FDI in China 
Source: China Data Online 
Note: Each vertical dash line represents the year of anti-Japanese protests in China 
 
South Korea  
The data (Figure 4, a) shows that South Korean FDI in China declined significantly in 
2006, declined marginally in 2011, and remained unchanged in 2013. It is important to note that 
the declines in 2005 and 2012 were consistent with an ongoing trend in decline prior to the 
protests.  This suggests that the decline in FDI was not specifically due to the protest events. 
 
Taiwan 
The data (Figure 4, b) shows that Taiwanese FDI in China was unchanged in 2006 and 
marginally decreased in 2011. There was no data available for 2013. 
 
Russia 
The data (Figure 4, c) shows that Russian FDI in China declined significantly in 2006 and 
declined marginally in 2011. It is important to note that the declines in 2006 and 2011 were 
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consistent with an ongoing trend in decline. This suggests that the decline in FDI was not 
specifically due to the protest events. 
 
The data trends in Figures 4 have been summarized and are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Fluctuation in FDI from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Russia to China 
 Japan to China South Korea Taiwan Russia 
2006 
 
 
6.17% 
Decrease 
24.64% 
Decrease 
0.74% 
Decrease 
18.04 
Decrease 
2011 
 
 
74.43% 
Increase 
5.24% 
Decrease 
11.81% 
Decrease 
11.30% 
Decrease 
2013 
 
67.54% 
Decrease 
0.69% 
Increase 
No Data No Data 
Source: China Data Online and The Japan External Trade Organization 
 
Tables 2 and 3 have been consolidated for ease of comparison and are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Comparison to the Japan's FDI to China 
 Japan to 
China 
S. Korea 
to China 
Taiwan to 
China 
Russia 
to China 
Japan to 
The USA 
Japan to 
The UK 
Japan to 
Thailand 
Japan to 
Global 
2006 6.17% 
Decrease 
24.64% 
Decrease 
0.74% 
Decrease 
18.04 
Decrease 
23.34% 
Decrease 
150.44% 
Increase 
6.64% 
Decrease 
10.35% 
Increase 
2011 74.43% 
Increase 
5.24% 
Decrease 
11.81% 
Decrease 
11.30% 
Decrease 
60.23% 
Increase 
205.47% 
Increase 
217.36% 
Increase 
90.15% 
Increase 
2013 67.54% 
Decrease 
0.69% 
Increase 
No Data No Data 36.68% 
Increase 
12.10% 
Increase 
1,761.30% 
Increase 
10.37% 
Increase 
Source: China Data Online and The Japan External Trade Organization 
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Sentiment of Japanese Investors on Outward Japanese FDI in China 
The Japan External Trade Organization conducted a survey of Japanese firms in the 
aftermath of the 2005 protests to investigate the impact of the protests. They found that 10 
percent of respondents reported being affected by the protests and an additional 37 percent were 
concerned about possible future impacts of worsened relations. The main concerns about the 
impact of the protests were: “decreased sales from boycotts of Japanese goods, a tarnished image 
of Japanese products, worsening relationships with Chinese employees, disruption of production 
activities, and increased difficulty in securing personnel locally” (JETRO, 2005). Canceling or 
postponing investment projects in China was mentioned by 7.5 percent, and 5.6 percent are 
considering the possibility of scaling down their business activities in China. That is, downsizing 
present production bases in China or transferring business operations to a third country. With 
regard to business risk in China, 44.9 percent of respondent companies believe that risks have 
“increased” due to the anti-Japan demonstrations, as against 40.3% that perceive such risk as 
“unchanged” (JETRO, 2005). This survey shows the significance of these protests on the 
decision making process for Japanese businesses on FDI, both on starting to invest in China and 
relocation their existing operation in other countries. 
 
4.3 Public Opinion Survey Data  
Only 28 percent of the Japanese and 21 percent of the Chinese had positive views of each 
other as of 2006 as shown in Table 5, and people in both countries consider the other competitive, 
greedy, and arrogant ("Publics of Asian Powers Hold Negative Views of One Another," 2006). 
Japan has reduced its development aid to China because its public resents China’s lack of 
gratitude and worries about fueling China’s military buildup. According to the article on China 
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Daily (2005b), an October 2005 poll done jointly by Chinese and Japanese organizations found 
90 percent of Chinese blamed Japan for the poor relations between the two countries, while more 
than half the Japanese respondents said it was hard to tell which side was to blame.  
 
Table 5: Hostility Among Asian Neighbors in 2006 
 
Favorability rating of…   
China Japan 
     China (%) 
               Favorable  94 28 
               Unfavorable 5 71 
               Do Not Know 
 
1 1 
               Total 100 100 
   
     Japan   
                Favorable 21 77 
               Unfavorable 70 22 
               Do Not Know 9 1 
               Total 100 100 
Source: Pew Research Center available at  
http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/09/21/publics-of-asian-powers-hold-negative-views-of-one-
another/ 
 
Japanese Public Opinion 
A poll by Yomiuri Shimbun (2005a), one of Japan’s leading newspapers, conducted after 
the April 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations showed that overwhelming majorities of Japanese 
favored taking a tough stance against China. In December 2005, eight months after the protests, 
they found that approximately 72 percent of the respondents did not trust China. Also, 
deterioration of public opinion is found on the Japanese side according to an annual poll of 
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“current national public opinion” as surveyed by the Cabinet Office of Japan (Figure 5). The 
percentage of Japanese people who “did not feel close to China” rose from 47% in 2000 to 58% 
in 2004, further increasing to 81% by 2013 (Office, 2004).  
 
 
Figure 5: Feeling of closeness to China 
Source: Cabinet Office of Japan 
  
Chinese Public Opinion 
Hostile attitudes toward Japan have grown in recent years, according to the national 
surveys conducted by the Institute for Japanese Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social 
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Sciences. In 2002, 43.3 percent of Chinese people said they had unfriendly feelings against Japan. 
In 2004, the number had risen to 52.6 percent. Much of the Chinese antipathy toward Japan is 
genuine and historically rooted. And the survey showed  “…of those, 26 percent said they felt 
the way they did because Japan had invaded China, while 61.7 percent said that it was because, 
after five decades, Japan has still made no serious self-examination of its invasion” (2004). 
Yunuo Gen (2011) noted that the dislike of Japan has been simmering from its lack of repentant 
self-reflection regarding its invasion of and atrocities in Asia. Johnston’s (1996), study found the 
following: 
In China, the percent of urban Chinese residents who disliked Japan rose from 46% 
in the year 2000 to 59% in 2005. Data measuring Chinese feelings of amity on a 
scale of 1–100 (higher values indicate more positive feelings) show that Chinese 
amity toward Japan dropped from neutral levels of 50 in 1998 during the first year 
of the survey to a low of 30 in 2004. (p 638)  
 
4.4 Evaluation of Other Possible Independent Variables  
Exchange rate, Japanese Yen per 1 Chinese Yuan  
 Xing and Wan (2006) analyzed the role of exchange rates in the competition for FDI and 
they suggested that, “if the currency of one FDI recipient country appreciate against the currency 
of the sourcing country more than that of its rival, its FDI inflows will decrease while the FDI 
flowing into the competing country will increase” (p. 1). Other literatures also indicate the 
importance of the exchange rate in determining FDI (Blonigen, 1997; Froot & Stein, 1992; Klein 
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& Rosengren, 1994). According to Xing and Wan (2006), “a devaluation in the currency of the 
recipient country reduces production costs, measured in foreign currency, and increases the 
relative wealth of foreign investors, leading to an increase in FDI inflows” (p. 3).  In line with 
these studies, Abbott et al. (2012) showed that developing countries with more fixed and stable 
exchange rates tend to have greater levels of FDI than countries with flexible or floating 
exchange rates.  When examining 70 countries from 1984-2005 including China, they found that 
more stable exchange rates attract greater FDI. While the Chinese yuan has increased in value 
over the last ten years, it has remained stable and slowly increased rather than significantly 
fluctuate over time.  Between 2003 and 2013 the exchange rate averaged about 14 Japanese yen 
to the Chinese yuan.  After the 2012 protests, the rate changed from 13 to 16. This was a minimal 
change.  
Looking at the difference in exchange rates between 2004-2005, 2009-2010 and 2011-
2012, I found no significant fluctuation in the value.  As the literature suggests, the relatively 
stable exchange rate did not play a role in the massive fluctuation of the amount of FDI after 
2012. 
 
FDI policies change in China 
Government’s policy towards FDI plays an important role in attracting FDI. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, China was isolated from other countries due to political reasons. Since 1978, China 
has adopted reform and an opening up policy. Chinese government encourages FDI to develop 
China’s economy. China promulgated the Sino-China Equity Joint Venture Law in 1979 and the 
Foreign Capital Venture Law in 1986. After China joined the WTO in 2001, China reduced or 
abolished some performance requirements and other restrictions on FDI. However, there were no 
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new economic policies directly related to FDI implemented in the years of 2005, 2010 and 2012, 
therefore I argue that FDI policies in China did not play a role in the fluctuation of the amount of 
FDI during the period that I studied. 
 
4.5 Analysis 
The data presented in Table 4 suggests that macroeconomic trends and natural disasters 
were highly likely to affect Japanese FDI over the time interval of concern.  International FDI 
broadly declined in 2006, was mixed following the 2008 financial crisis, and broadly increased 
following recovery from the crisis. Japanese FDI in China was an exception to the broad 
international increase in FDI in 2013. It is likely that the larger magnitude, longer duration 
protests that occurred in 2012 over contentious contemporary and historical issues contributed to 
dramatic decreases in the amount of Japanese outward FDI in China.  
The FDI data provides circumstantial evidence for the theory that anti-Japanese protests 
influence the amount of Japanese FDI, which supports the neorealist hypothesis. Other 
independent variables, such as currency exchange rates, FDI policy changes, and regional factors 
were found to have no significant effect on Japanese FDI in China. While the data analysis 
applied limited control variables, the results are suggestive. Although investment decisions are 
complex and take into account many factors, the decision to dramatically contract Japanese FDI 
to China in late 2012 and early 2013 appears to be a direct economic response to the 2012 
political protests. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
My contribution to the literature is threefold. First, I presented contemporary data by 
reviewing data from 2001 to 2013. Second, the specific variables that are unique to China and 
Japan were evaluated. Third, I studied the amount of Japanese outward FDI to China to study the 
economic effects of politics. My purpose for this paper is to determine whether politics 
influences economics between these specific countries.  
The results support the neo-realist theory that politics trump economics during periods of 
heightened political tension. Despite the relatively high level of economic integration, China and 
Japan appear to prioritize their political relations over economic relations during periods of 
tension. Therefore, politically negative events such as anti-Japanese protests in China could 
influence the amount of Japanese FDI in China depending on the magnitude of the protests.   
This study has two important limitations. The first limitation is regarding the number of 
people that participated in the protests. Due to the inherent difficulty of gathering accurate and 
complete demographic data for the number of participants, media and some government sources 
have rarely reported their overall size. The second limitation is the lack of other possible 
explanations for the fluctuation of the amount of Japanese FDI in China. Although I looked at 
exchange rates and tax policy changes in addition to regional trends, there could be many other 
determinants of Japanese FDI in China such as market size, cost of capital, wages and exchange 
rates, etc. Nevertheless, this study’s conclusion suggests that it is possible to assume that these 
negative events might influence the amount of FDI.  
Despite the limitations of this study, a key point can be taken from this project. That is, 
both China and Japan would benefit from an amicable relationship. After all, they have the most 
to gain from the creation of, or most to lose from the lack of, the amicable relationship. Amicable 
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relations could then promote mutual advantages in terms of developing their economies and 
lessen any conflicts that do arise. 
I informed that there are mainly two controversial issues that Japan and China have at the 
moment; how Japan has dealt with the atrocities it committed during World War II and the 
dispute over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands. This study finds that history is important and the 
acrimony about the interpretation of the Sino-Japanese War very much influences present and 
likely future relations between China and Japan. If what happened in the past between China and 
Japan hinders economic opportunities and how Japanese politicians have dealt with is the key 
point, Japan should make an effort to harmonize relations with China. Not only should Japanese 
politicians consider the sincerity of their statements of apology for what Japan did to China, they 
should support their action by discontinuing their visits to Yasukuni shrine to honor the Japanese 
war dead who committed war atrocities against the Chinese people. Although this idea will be 
unpopular among Japanese nationalists, it is necessary for Japan to take this action if it will 
improve relations. In addition, Japan should change the contents of their history textbooks to 
include Japanese war atrocities. This would serve as an acknowledgment of the events and 
Japanese youth would have the opportunity to know about their history.  
As for Chinese side, when Chinese people have anti-Japanese protests, nationalism plays 
one of the major roles in motivating them, as they are motivated by nationalism as much as by 
anger about Japanese action. Nationalistic education in China, especially portrayed in “patriotic 
education campaigns”, promotes potentially destructive nationalism amongst Chinese people. 
Excessive nationalism in Chinese people may have the potential to harm their own economy and 
development. However, it should be left to the CCP to determine the acceptable degree of 
nationalism in Chinese citizens. I would argue that the Chinese educational system controlled by 
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the CCP is a key for China and Japan to have a better relationship in the near future. It should be 
noted that the exam-based format of schooling might deter creative thought and, therefore, make 
it easier for nationalistic sentiments to flourish (Geng, 2011). On the other hand, education has 
the potential to foster in youth the ability to understand multiple points of view. If Chinese youth 
could learn the Japanese point of view and Japanese youth could learn the Chinese perspective, 
China-Japan relations might be much improved. 
The data suggest that anti-Japanese protests can have a negative influence on the Chinese 
economy when Japanese FDI diminishes. Over the last 20 years and especially after the 1997 
massive closure of state owned industries in China, there has been a rise in anti-Japanese rhetoric 
at Chinese universities and in the media. Indeed, the relatively recent increase in the protests 
coincides with the social changes in China regarding reduced state support for urban workers 
following the closure of state industries. As Zhao (1998, 2005) and Shirk (2009) suggest, the 
CCP seems to be the driving force behind rising nationalism and even anti-Japanese themes in 
media and education. In 2005 and 2010, the CCP witnessed anti-Japanese protests without any 
economic repercussions from Japan in terms of trade or FDI disruption. However, the larger and 
more destructive 2012 protests seem to have a negative influence on Japanese FDI and Japanese 
business invested less in the immediate aftermath of the protests. Scholars suggest that the CCP 
rely on economic development and nationalism for political legitimacy, but in the past these 
tended to be relatively separate phenomena that did not overlap or clash. This study suggests that 
increased nationalism in the form of anti-Japanese protests can have a negative influence on the 
economy. This may not bode well for the CCP in the long run. 
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